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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible 
remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged 
behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able 
to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author 
discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and 
via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs 
depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree, 
the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network, 
IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not 
so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects 
will probably fail.
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Résumé
Le but de cet article est de présenter le droit irrévocable d’usage (IRU) comme un 
remède possible pour les projets d’infrastructure de télécommunications de l’UE 
qui, en Pologne, ont été lancés avec du retard. Grâce à l’IRU, les bénéficiaires de 
ces projets européens seront en mesure d’épargner à la fois le temps et l’argent 
pour terminer des projects avec succès. L’auteur décrit deux méthodes possibles 
de mise en œuvre de l’IRU: par l’obligation réglementaire et par le bias de bonne 
fois de l’opérateur historique. L’auteur propose un modèle de la théorie des 
jeux avec des gains qui dépendra de la stratégie choisie par le législateur et par 
l’opérateur historique. Par l’utilisation d’un arbre de la théorie des jeux, l’auteur 
montre que si seulement l’opérateur historique est prêt à offrir son propre réseau, 
l’IRU peut être signé, ce qui en effet aboutira à la disparition de la plupart des 
retards dans la mise en oeuvre des projets. Le succès n’est pas si évident dans le 
cas où la mise en œuvre de l’IRU est une obligation – là, les projets européens 
échoueront probablement. 
Classifications and key words: Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU); long-term 
agreement; third party access; telecom market; entry barriers; infrastructure owner; 
entrants; infrastructure; EU projects.
I. Introduction
The telecommunications market is one of the fastest-growing in the 
economy nowadays. The expansion of ICT will continue since knowledge and 
information flow are crucial for competitive advantages. Still, in many countries 
such as Poland there is a bottleneck in the telecom market: entry barriers. 
These have caused problems with quality and accessibility to infrastructure 
as well as with upgrades and investment.
The aim of this article is to analyze a new remedy for entry barriers – an 
Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU). IRU is a long-term agreement between 
infrastructure owners and newcomers. Although it is similar to leased lines 
and other third party access mechanisms, it is a better substitute to building 
a new network than the two aforementioned solutions (the licensee is treated 
as an owner of infrastructure, usually with amortizsation rights). 
An Indefeasible Right of Use may be imposed as a regulatory tool or 
as a good will gesture of the incumbent. This article focuses on this aspect 
providing a voice in the debate on whether to regulate IRU or not. The first 
part presents the applicable theoretical background. As mentioned, the main 
problem with infrastructure investments and the development of competition 
in telecoms are entry barriers. A taxonomy of entry barriers in light of existing 
VOL. 2012, 5(7)
TO REGULATE OR NOT TO REGULATE? – ECONOMIC APPROACH…  145
economics literature is presented next and crucial entry barriers related to the 
use of IRU identified. 
The second part of the article contains practical aspects of entry barriers. 
Many instruments have already been used in order to handle them: third party 
access, wholesale price regulation, improving the investment process and public 
aid. Even the European Union has provided funds for telecom infrastructure 
building and modernization. The problem is how to spend these EU funds prop-
erly and achieve from then the biggest possible added value. Few regulatory 
tools similar to IRU were presented with entry barriers they were to fight with.
The next part of the paper is devoted strictly to IRU. Differences between 
IRU and previous regulatory tools, setting up IRU prices and challenges in 
implementing IRU are stressed. A game theory model is presented next to show 
different results depending on the methodology used of IRU implementation 
(by regulatory obligation or by choice of the incumbent). The assumptions of 
such a model are key here and thus they are described in detail. The analysis 
and assumptions applied in this paper are all coherent with the Polish telecoms 
market and Polish experiences. The Polish example is visible in problems with 
infrastructure investments, spending EU funds and documents prepared by 
polish regulatory authority, but it does not mean that the paper is not useful 
for other country.
The article closes with a resolution of the game theory model. It leads to 
the conclusion that IRU may improve the level of infrastructure investments, 
but only under certain circumstances.
II. Theoretical background 
The concept of Indefeasible Right of Use (hereafter, IRU) is based on a 
theoretical problem called entry barriers. Entry barriers differ in their origins: 
some are caused by legal measures, some derive from behavioral issues and 
others have an economic background. A taxonomy of entry barriers, under 
economics literature studies, is shown below:
1) legal entry barriers – appear only as an effect of law restrictions and 
may be characterized by asymmetric treatment of market players (the 
rules are in favor of enterprises that were given an exclusive right to run 
a business); they are the most volatile and unstable of all entry barriers: 
they may be cancelled with a regulatory decision; common examples are: 
licenses, quality service obligations (formal standards), and patents;
2) behavioral entry barriers – are considered to exist wherever one firm 
tries to abuse its market power (and fights with competitors in an 
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uncompetitive way); these barriers are not as easy to eliminate as legal 
ones, but may be limited by the imposition of new regulatory obligations 
(dedicated to significant market power enterprises); examples are usually: 
mobility costs, localization, experience and asymmetric information, and 
price reactions to entry attempts;
3) technological barriers – are linked with the specifics of a given sector, type 
of activity, cost structure and difficulties resulting from historical reasons; 
they are constant, steady and hard to remove by regulation; most popular 
examples are: cost advantages, sunk costs, capital restrictions, time-
consuming startup of a business, uncertainty and asymmetric information.
IRU is most relevant to economic entry barriers. An overview of literature 
made it possible to summarize certain theories in Table 1, where each 
mentioned economic author treats different factors as entry barriers. Aside 
from their division, there is little consensus about counting each economic 
factor as a barrier. Herein, the assumption is made that a barrier is anything 
that literature has ever considered as such.
Table 1.  A set of factors treated as entry barriers in different economic theories 
(chronological order)12
Author1
Factor
Scale 
effect
Product 
differentia-
tion
Cost 
advantage
Capital 
require-
ments2
Time-con-
suming Uncertainty
Bain
Stigler
Caves/Porter
Gilbert
Noga
Carlton/Perloff
McAfee/Mialon/
Williams
Schmalensee
Pindyck
Carlton
– the factor is a barrier – the factor is partly treated as a barrier – the factor is not a barrier
Source: Author’s own studies
1 Bain (1956), Stigler (1968), Caves/Porter (1977), Fisher (1979), Weizacker (1980), Gilbert 
(1989), Schmalensee (1981, 2004), Noga (1993), Carlton/Perloff (1994), McAfee/Mialon/
Williams (2004), Pindyck (2005), Carlton (2005).
2 The table presents ‘capital requirements’ together with ‘sunk costs’.
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Among factors listed in table 1, only product differentiation is distanced 
from IRU. The rest are linked to IRU, either directly or indirectly. Especially 
capital requirements and time-consuming activities are factors IRU is believed 
to remedy. The reasoning on the link between the IRU (or other third 
party access tools) and entry barriers was always well analyzed by the polish 
regulatory body or by researches conducted by experts3. What is both clear 
and obvious here is that if a new entrant has no infrastructure, it needs to 
build it. Network design, research of local conditions and finally construction 
are costly and time consuming. Entering the market simultaneously alerts the 
incumbent of the emergence of a new competitor. Delay means more time 
for an incumbent to prepare a strategy to fight against the new competitor. 
In this case the entrant has no chance. What a regulatory body usually does, 
is to ensure a fast and effective entry – usually by granting fair access to the 
incumbent’s existing infrastructure.
III. Practical background
The telecommunication market has been trying to solve issues related 
to entry barriers for years. Many activities have already been undertaken 
to remove this bottleneck. Privatisation, third party access and quality or 
price regulation were the most popular and effective types of regulation. 
It is suggested by other world’s examples, where the situation was changed 
after the incumbent’s privatization. Most of them are asymmetric, imposing 
an obligation only upon the incumbent enterprise, giving free choice to its 
competitors. That is why it is crucial to set payments carefully and make an 
honest cost-benefit analysis.
Product differentiation in the telecoms market is only a marketing matter. 
If networks look the same and technology and technical standards are the 
same, there is no place to compete through product differentiation. The only 
way to compete is creating different bundles of services, different prices and 
level of post-sale service.
Cost advantages come from amortization and scope effects. An incumbent 
has obviously the biggest client database, access to the best market research 
and most experience. That is why it is not a problem for an incumbent to 
proceed in the cheapest and yet effective way – provided there is an impulse 
to do so. It is hard to regulate and remove this barrier and treat the incumbent 
in a fair way compared to new entrants. In this case, a regulatory body usually 
3 To get detailed information please see The analysis of TP’s functional separation, UKE 
2008; The regulatory strategy for telecom market in years 2008-2012, UKE, Warsaw 2008. 
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concentrates on improving newcomers’ financial prospects, by setting price-
cost obligations whereby each fee should be based on a reasonable cost of 
services. Regulatory accounting obligations have a similar aim.
Crucial for entry barriers are those telecom regulations that relate to third 
party access. Wholesale line rental (WLR), Bitstream Access (BSA) and Local 
Loop Unbundling (LLU) are the most popular ones which impose upon the 
incumbent an obligation to make its network accessible. The aforementioned 
tools differ as to the level of access to the incumbent’s network, the type of tech-
nology and the range of retail services that the entrants can provide. In all cases 
the regulator sets (or at least accepts) access prices. Actually, WRL, BSA and 
LLU are very similar to IRU, as far as IRU is a long-lasting access obligation.
Capital requirements have been solved lately with EU funds. A variety of 
activities that can be funded through EU resources gives the newcomers the 
opportunity to build their own networks even in unattractive areas, i.e. areas 
with low population density. It does not mean that European Union is wasteful 
and spends its money in inappropriate way. The primary EU’s aim is to prevent 
social exclusion and it is more important than business profitability4. The EU 
is willing to help in telecom infrastructure development. Through different 
countries’ institutions, it helps in exchanging experience between EU projects 
Beneficiaries (in Poland the most of Beneficiaries are municipal authorities), 
Table 2. Regulations and their influence on entry barriers
Regulation
Entry barrier
Scale 
effect
Product 
differen-
tiation
Cost 
advantage
Capital 
require-
ments
Time-con-
suming
Uncertainty
(with asymmetric 
information)
Quality regulation
Price regulation
Accountant regulation
Price-cost relationship
Third Party Access 
(WLR, BSA, LLU)
EU funds
IRU
– the regulation affects a certain entry barrier – the regulation does not affect an entry barrier
Source: Author’s own studies based on: W. Borucki, K. Bielewicz, P. Radziulis, The Relevance 
Analysis of implementing WLR in Poland, Instytut Technik Telekomunikacyjnych i Informatyc-
znych, Poznań 2005, UKE Market reports and P.Bijl, M Peitz, Regulation and Entry into Telecom-
munication Markets, 2004.
4 For more information see Digital Agenda for Europe (European Commission, 2010).
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improves qualifications by way of courses and training, and controls schedules 
and funding. The one thing the EU is not able to control is investment process – 
just because the lack and the lag of information about real progress of projects’ 
realization. This variable seems to be crucial for infrastructure build-out.
Table 2 is a summary of the considerations presented above.
IV.  Game theory model for Indefeasible Right of Use – 
economics approach
1. IRU definition 
Talking about IRU and infrastructure investments may flow in different 
ways. The way of thinking about the subject is determined by definitions. The 
first question to ask is what does IRU stand for? This article treats IRU as 
an agreement between the infrastructure owner and the telecoms enterprise 
interested in leasing it on a long-term basis. The IRU user can unconditionally 
and exclusively use some part of the telecom network (usually optical fibres) 
for about 20 years. From an accounting point of view, the user of infrastructure 
is treated as the network owner. Depending on the type of IRU agreement, it 
can be treated as a leasing, usufruct or right familiar to financial leasing. The 
type of IRU agreement used has its implications for cost eligibility. Herein 
a simplification is made whereby IRU expenditure is an eligible cost in all 
cases. It means that the beneficiaries of EU projects can always get back the 
money that they have spent.
Payment for IRU is typically divided into two parts:
– lump sum (also called balloon amount) – the greatest part of the 
IRU budget that is paid at the beginning of the IRU period; it should 
correspond to infrastructure costs;
– periodic fee – paid every month or year, not budget consuming; should be 
calculated taking into account the inflation rate, economic fluctuations, 
plus infrastructure upgrades and maintenance of IRU services.
IRU is usually treated as a co-investment solution to build joint infrastructure. 
Typically co-investors are an incumbent operator (infrastructure owner) and 
a state-owned shareholder (including municipal agencies). It provides a huge 
benefit when considering inefficient duplication of infrastructure, the time 
consuming investment process or problems with financing a new network. But 
under these great sounding phrases, IRU generates many problems, mainly 
because of future uncertainty. Businesses participated in the IRU should 
take into account: What if the infrastructure grantor goes bankrupt? What 
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if he loses its ‘significant market power’? How is the proper value of IRU 
calculated? What about infrastructure upgrades and new technologies? Who 
should bear the risk of a long-lasting contract? And policy-makers should 
keep in mind: Is it an appropriate way of stimulating competition? Is it really 
helpful for EU projects?
2. Model assumptions
The important question is thus: should IRU be regulated or not? In other 
words: what effects would these two alternatives generate (regulated or non-
regulated IRU)? This problem is analyzed using game theory.
A few assumptions are made here for the model of the consequences 
of IRU.
1. First, the main aim is to spend EU funds on time by building telecoms 
infrastructure wherever there is a lack thereof. Thinking this way makes 
it possible to formalize the following statement: investments should 
proceed fast, as beneficiaries have only 3 years to finish their projects. 
Beneficiaries should also make their investments cost-effectively – 
otherwise they won’t get their expenditure reimbursed by the EU.
2. The second assumption is about players. 3 main actors exist here: an 
infrastructure owner (typically an incumbent), the EU funds Beneficiary 
(the public sector who is actually an executor of an EU project5) and the 
regulator. The first wants to maximize its profits. Moreover, it obstructs 
the fulfillment of all obligations that the regulator imposes upon it. 
Threatened by a new obligation, the incumbent will try to hold it off 
by spending money to postpone the arrival of regulation. As a result, 
the EU-funded project fails – the infrastructure is built too late. This is 
a catastrophe, because the EU won’t reimburse the project and the aim 
of building the infrastructure won’t be achieved. The second actor, the 
Beneficiary, has its own goal: to finish the project on time because it’s 
the only way to get its costs reimbursed. Its success is determined only 
by the time of the IRU offer. If the facilities owner is ready to sign an 
IRU contract on time, the Beneficiary will finish its project. Otherwise, it 
won’t. The third actor, the regulator, wants to maximize social benefit no 
matter which of the other actors it will support. That is why the regulator 
should take into account the costs of failed projects as well as the costs 
of regulation and make a regulatory impact assessment before acting.
5 There are some projects leading by private sector units but most of EU telecom 
infrastructure projects are executed by municipal authorities or by public-private partnerships.
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3. The third assumption is about payoffs – the costs of regulation and IRU 
delays (this is why only half of EU projects are successful). Additionally, 
regulation is usually accompanied by a loss of flexibility. It diminishes 
the incumbent’s profit gained from IRU. In payoffs, certain factors are 
taken into account, fulfilling the following assumptions:
• ΠB > 0 – Beneficiaries’ profits is higher than zero;
• ΠBE > 0 – Beneficiaries’ fines in case of failed of EU projects they lead;
• Πp > 0 – incumbent’s profit in optimistic scenario is positive (more 
than zero);
• Πn < 0 – incumbent’s profit in pessimistic scenario is negative (less 
than zero);
• CR > 0 – cost of IRU regulation;
• CO > 0 – cost of incumbent’s opportunity behaviour;
• ε > 0 – cost of the lack of elasticity, caused by regulatory obligation;
• 0.5*Πn + CO < 0 – cost of incumbent’s opportunity behavior is less 
than the loss of pessimistic scenario.
4. The last assumption is about the uncertainty included in the model. 
There are two options:
• optimistic (market will develop well and IRU will generate profit),
• pessimistic (market will not develop as one should expect and IRU 
will generate a loss).
3. Strategic behaviours
A set of strategies is dedicated only to the regulator (government) and 
infrastructure owner. The regulatory body may impose an IRU regulation or 
let the actors act in a spontaneous way. This means that IRU may be chosen 
as a regulatory tool, may be launched by the incumbent according to its own 
rules or may not happen at all. The incumbent may be willing to sign the IRU 
contract or it might not. If it is not happy to sign the contract, it will try to 
delay the imposition of IRU. The EU funds Beneficiary has no choice in this 
game scenario – it can only deal with the results of the actions of the other two 
players. Still, the regulator’s interest takes into account the Beneficiary’s goals.
The regulator is first to make a choice as it is the one who sets the rules. Unfor-
tunately, there is a lack of information: no one knows the future and no one is able 
to say whether in 20–25 years (at the end of the IRU contract) the situation will 
be positive (optimistic option) or negative (pessimistic option). The uncertainty 
of the game is taken into account with the 4th assumption of the model.
The optimistic option, from the infrastructure owner’s point of view, means 
it will gain positive result (above zero): profits denoted as Πp. The pessimistic 
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option means that the incumbent’s profits will be negative (below zero) – 
denoted as Πn.
Moreover, implementation of regulation always takes time: the regulator 
needs to analyze the market, prepare a proper regulatory act, conduct a public 
consultation, analyze all comments and make a cost-benefit analysis. This 
means that only some infrastructure projects will be finished successfully 
(those with the biggest delays will not). In the payoff, it is denoted as 0.5*ΠB 
(half of all EU funds that are able to be reimbursed). IRU without regulatory 
intervention gives all EU funds: ΠB, because in this case all projects will be 
finished successfully. Figure 1 shows the game tree representation of the 
payoffs (also known as the extensive form representation).
REGULATOR
INCUMBENT
regulate
INCUMBENT
not regulate
wants IRU 
NATURE
optimistic pesimistic
regulate not regulate
INCUMBENT INCUMBENT
SOCIAL = –ΠBE – CR < 0
INCUMBENT = 0.5* Πp – CO – ε 
SOCIAL = 0.5*ΠB – CR 
INCUMBENT = Πp – ε 
SOCIAL = –ΠBE < 0
INCUMBENT = 0 
SOCIAL = ΠB
INCUMBENT = Πp
SOCIAL = –ΠBE – CR < 0
INCUMBENT = 0.5* Πn – CO – ε < 0 
SOCIAL = 0.5*ΠB – CR 
INCUMBENT = Πn – ε < 0  
SOCIAL = 0 
INCUMBENT = 0 
SOCIAL =ΠB
INCUMBENT = 0.5* Πn < 0
doesn’twant 
IRU
wantsIRU 
doesn’twant 
IRU
doesn’twant 
IRU wantsIRU 
wants IRU 
doesn’twant 
IRU
Figure 1. An extensive version of the IRU model
4. The results
In the game theory tree (Figure 1) eight different results are visible. 
Suppose the game is played with the optimistic option. The regulator decides 
to regulate IRU or not and it chooses the first possibility: regulated IRU. The 
next step belongs to the facilities owner (the incumbent) that may behave 
obstructively to signing an IRU agreement or not. Suppose it will also choose 
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the first option. What is the result? From the regulator’s point of view we 
have a double delay: one caused by the implementation of the regulation 
and the second caused by the delay tactics of the incumbent. Because of this, 
several EU projects fail and Beneficiaries lose all incurred expenditure. The 
EU will punish the Beneficiary with a quota denoted as –ΠBE. The negative 
sign of profit shows that (in the above scenario) it was better not to start the 
EU project at all. The amount will be diminished by the cost of regulation 
(CR). What about the incumbent? It behaves obstructively so effectively that 
it manages to block the implementation of the IRU obligation. That is why 
it ‘earns’ 0 from IRU contracts, but because of its obstructive effort, CO will 
not be saved. From the incumbent’s point of view, the payoff with regulation 
is worse than without regulation, i.e. as a loss of elasticity, which is denoted 
as ε. The incumbent, however, stayed away from the IRU contract, so it loses 
– (CO + ε). 
Supposing now that the incumbent is willing to sign the IRU contract (in 
accordance with the regulator’s orders and the optimistic option). Other 
previous assumptions are ceteris paribus. The change in its payoff is obvious: 
now it will earn Πp from IRU minus ε. The incumbent is not against regulation, 
and will not bear the obstruction cost CO. From a social (or regulatory) point 
of view, half of the projects end successfully: 0,5*ΠB, minus the costs of 
regulation: CR. In this case, using a backward induction points out that if 
only the IRU is regulated, the infrastructure owner will choose to sign an 
IRU contract – it prefers Πp – ε > 0 to 0 – CO – ε <0 provided the incumbent 
proceeds in a rational way.
Staying with the optimistic variant, let’s suppose that the regulatory body 
chooses not to regulate IRU. There are no regulation costs CR and elasticity 
costs ε. The incumbent may still behave in the same way: either sign the IRU 
contract or not. The final results are as follows: 
• the incumbent doesn’t sign an IRU contract:
 no project succeeds, so social result equals –ΠBE;
 the incumbent has no agreement and earns 0;
• the incumbent signs an IRU contract:
 all projects succeed, social result equals ΠB;
 the incumbent earns ΠP.
The pessimistic option will proceed similarly, as can be seen in Figure 1. The 
game theory model (with the above assumptions, strategies and aims) suggests 
the conclusion that irrespective of external circumstances (in other words, 
irrespective of a ‘Nature’ factor), there is no justification for implementing 
IRU through a regulatory path. Rationality alone will lead an incumbent to 
choose an IRU agreement in the most efficient way. If the regulator comes 
into action, an incumbent will become opportunistic and delay IRU. This 
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is why, if IRU is to support EU funds, it should be left out of the ambit 
of regulatory obligations. Otherwise, most of delayed EU projects are going 
to fail.
V. Problems and conclusions
There are some limitations in above game theory model. First of all it 
ignores some behavioural aspects as blocking IRU and blocking market entries, 
using cross subsidy and gaining higher incumbent’s profits because of the lack 
of competition. It may be developed in a further and more detailed research. 
The analysis may also be developed with other countries cases. Although these 
obvious limitations, the presented model is not unrealistic as far as polish 
telecom market review seems to be constant. First of all, Polish incumbent 
is interested in long-term agreements. The argument is Polish incumbent’s 
involvement in preparing IRU offer (the half of the year 2012), preliminary 
negotiations with some of these EU projects’ Beneficiaries, consulting these 
works with external advisors6. The second mentioned limitation (using cross 
subsidy) is illegal from competition law point of view. The incumbent may gain 
higher profits but (as a significant market power) it will probably have to pay 
huge fine for it (so it is not worth).
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